studying the situation, these institutions claimed that this lack of growth resulted from the import substitution model implemented by Latin American countries in previous decades. According to this model, protective tariffs and subsidies for key industries that produced for the internal market insulated developing economies from world competition (2) . Participation of multinational corporations in internal markets occurred mostly in the form of direct investments; governmentally established rules prevented any rapid flow of capital from the countries. The IFIs' diagnosis of the import substitution model emphasized that the central role of state administrations as owners of companies and as providers of services and social welfare favored a stagnation of the economies.
Policy recommendations, resulting from this causal diagnosis of the Latin American crisis, introduced these countries to the new economic order inaugurated by the Washington Consensus at the end of the 1980s (3). To facilitate this process, the World Bank led the development and implementation of structural adjustment policies (SAPs)-the first step in introducing Latin America to so-called globalization. The SAPs required deeper transformations of the societies to facilitate the opening up of markets to foreign investors in areas previously managed by state administrations, and conversion of health and education into commodities. The new policies compelled countries to fundamentally change the role of the state, since IFIs demanded contraction of public expenditures, control of monetary expansion, and reform of the state structure itself. These changes aimed to regularize payment of the external debt and to restructure the economies according to the new economic rules.
All these requirements originated from profound changes during the capitalist crisis of the mid-1970s. At that time, capital started to shift from the production of goods to the financial market, as manufacturing became less profitable due to the increased costs of labor and raw materials (4) . The owners of companies that produced goods moved their capital to the financial market, strengthening the international private banking system. In Latin America, the characteristics of financial transfers changed dramatically between 1960 and 1978. In 1960, 50.1 percent of funds received by Latin America derived from public sources (especially U.S. public funds), 58.6 percent from private direct investments, and only 11.4 percent from banks. In 1978, the participation of public funds decreased to 7.3 percent, private direct investments fell to 16 percent, and financial transfers from private banks rose to 61.1 percent (5) .
In the hands of private banks, financial transfers moved around the world in search of the most profitable investments. Many of these transfers involved offshore markets that played a central role during this period of capitalism. U.S. investors in offshore markets increased from 8 million in 1984 to 20 million in 1997. In 1999, according to estimations by U.S. experts, offshore markets received $7 trillion in investments. In 1980, pension funds invested in offshore markets totaled $4 billion; by 1999, the sum rose to $60 billion. As an advantage of offshore markets, investors could avoid paying taxes to any countries and could conduct illegal transactions beyond the control of country's authorities (6) . All these processes formed the basis of financial transnationalization, which permitted the unlinking of capital from any specific nationality. Offshore operations played an important role in the health care reforms of Latin American countries, as we have documented especially for Argentina's health reform process (7) .
These changes also transformed multinational corporations into worldwide networks that operated without exclusive national linkage to any country. This process, nurtured by the development of electronic industries that decreased technology costs, allowed decreased production costs. The electronics industry modified the organization of companies and the labor force, as well as consumer patterns. This new technology, requiring fewer workers and facilitating the constant creation of new products, created structural unemployment that marginalized millions of people worldwide and brought about a huge concentration of wealth among a few. 1 The attacks on the welfare state introduced during the 1980s, including cutbacks in the public sector such as health services and education, accompanied these changes in economic production (9) .
Most Latin American governments responded to the financial crisis of the 1980s and 1990s by accepting the SAPs. These policies resulted in increased indebtedness, the opening up of national economies to multinational finance capital, and the restructuring of the state via privatization affecting industrial production, services, and natural resources, as well as decreased public expenditures on social and health services (10) . In the health care environment, SAPs required the acceptance by Latin American governments of the reform projects initiated by the IFIs, particularly the World Bank. By consenting to the requirements, governments gained access to loans to be used for reform of their health care systems. The most important health care reform accepted by the governments opened social security and public funds to management by national and multinational for-profit companies, most of which already maintained well-developed financial activities in international and offshore markets.
ARGENTINA
In 1989 a huge economic, political, and social crisis shocked Argentina. The crisis included hyperinflation (over a six-month period at an average annual percent of 4,900), which produced widespread social disintegration and a politically unmanageable situation. Emergency elections changed the government. The crisis produced a traumatic collective experience that helped the new government justify acceptance of the SAPs defined by the World Bank and International
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Monetary Fund (11) . In 1991, the deregulation of the economy and privatization of public companies began, accompanied by health care system reforms influenced by the World Bank.
During the 1980s, the Bank granted loans in four areas: hospital decentralization, development of human resources, a health information network, and health promotion and protection. But in the 1990s, the loans required that new projects concentrate on the reform of public hospitals (hospital self-management) and the deregulation of social security funds. These policies aimed to introduce market logic into the public and social security institutions; to reduce state participation in financing, administration, and delivery of services; and to enhance the role of the private sector (12, 13) .
Health sector reform projects carried out with these international loans have served as a basis for the elaboration of legal norms (laws, ordinances, ministry resolutions) that substantiate new social discourses linked to the crisis of the welfare state (14) . Gradually, the previous commonsense conceptualization of health, illness, and health care services changed; health care no longer was a universal right for which the state was responsible, but rather a commodity that individuals could acquire (7) . This fundamental change in definition led to a situation in which health stopped being a public good and became a private good (15) . This transformation of the commonsense approach pertained to health services and other areas of collective life. Common sense is a real shared sense, in that it provides a common direction for the whole of society. Common sense is a central component of the social cement that fills the gaps and artificially smooths out social contradictions. Common sense determines the subjectivity of the shared situation for all social actors, regardless of their place in the social structure (16) .
To reach the goal of radically reforming the system, IFIs, together with officials of the executive branch of the government, developed an intentional segmented process of health reforms by sequentially negotiating projects with the public, private, or social security sectors, without any unified approach toward the entire health care system. They selected this gradual process in order to reduce political conflict and avoid the creation of alliances among sectors (17) . As we will see, the controllers of financial capital, multinational and national, took advantage of loopholes in the reform regulations of the health care system to enter into the management of public health care and social security institutions, despite legal norms forbidding it.
The Argentinean health care system experienced a profound transformation because the introduction of financial capital (national and transnational) changed the system's logic. Previously, the Argentinean people had recognized health care as a right, guaranteed by the Constitution, that the state must provide. This conception of health care as a right did not imply that health care was free. Taxes and social security institutions financed public health programs and health care services from obligatory salary contributions and taxes. Tax collection in Argentina remained very regressive (sales tax was 21 percent on every product, while the tax on capital gains and profits was less than 10 percent). But this inequity was worsened by changing the social contract through the health reforms imposed by IFIs and the national government. These reforms implemented cutbacks in state social expenditures that increased the amount of money each family needed to pay out of pocket to obtain health care and preventive services, such as vaccinations.
Health reform in Argentina transformed the public and social security sectors deeply. As a principal goal, the reform introduced market logic into the social security sector and broke the basis of solidarity on which the sector was originally developed. Introduction of market logic into the public sector created competition among public hospitals, and between public and private providers, for operational budget funds. In both sectors, the benefits that people received without payment (public sector) or extra payments (social security) decreased, obligating people to pay more out of pocket through copayments and user fees.
In short, the government definanced the public and the social security sectors, while government officials explained that it was the inefficiency of these institutions that caused the inadequate services. According to the government's discourse, introducing competition and private investors into the system would resolve these problems (7) .
Reforms developed and partially financed by the World Bank, the IADB, and the Argentinean government achieved their objectives. A process of deregulation-regulation facilitated the entry of financial capital, most of which came from international sources operating in offshore markets. Pension and mutual fund administrators and insurance companies, which became involved in the administration of social security funds and public hospitals, purchased the prepaid plans, previously controlled by local companies under the leadership of physicians. Shortly before the 2001 Argentinean crisis, almost all these internationally owned companies were sold after transferring huge profits to offshore markets, thus allowing them to replicate the same cycle in other countries or in different activities (7) .
TEN YEARS OF STRUCTURAL ADJUSTMENT AND HEALTH CARE SYSTEM REFORM
Data presented here will show the impact of ten years of SAPs on the economy and poverty in Argentina. In the first eight months of 2002, Argentina's annual inflation rate climbed from 10 to 67 percent (18). The country's gross domestic product (GDP) decreased 15 percent in the first six months of 2002, which became the fourth consecutive negative GDP year (19) . The external debt, both public and private, reached $147,881 billion by 1999, 47 percent of the GDP (approximately $85 billion for public and $60 billion for private debts). The interest payments on the debt at that time, using three measures, had a huge impact on the economy; these obligations amounted to 10 percent of the GDP, or 23 percent of the annual federal budget, or 75 percent of all exports. The interest payments grew by 80 percent between 1992 and 2000. In 1975 the per capita debt was $320, while in 2000 it rose to $3,800. The fiscal deficit amounted to 18 percent of the GDP between 1994 and 1999, or $50 billion financed by public borrowings (20) . In December 2001, the Argentinean government defaulted on its foreign debt, at this point $132 billion, and in November 2002 on its World Bank loans as well. However, "default" does not convey the reality that, between March 1976 (when the military took over the government through a coup d'état) and 2001, Argentina paid approximately $200 billion to external creditors (21) . Some estimations indicate that, by 2001, national and international groups moved around $120 billion out of the country, including $24 billion between March and December 2001, just before the government decided to freeze the public's individual savings accounts. In addition, international private finance companies owned about 80 percent of the Argentinean external debt. The external debt and these movements of capital outside the country represented a transfer of the wealth of the working people to national and transnational groups involved in financial activities. Argentina's dominant class, in association with foreign groups, contributed to the crisis through fiscal evasion, flight of capital, and corruption (11) .
Between 1991 and 1998, the Argentinean economy grew by 5 percent annually and productivity increased 30 percent, but the average salary increased only 3 percent. In 2001, the government, following the IFIs' recommendations, decreased salaries and pensions between 12 and 30 percent, and devaluation of the currency resulted in another 300 percent reduction. The market lost about 750,000 job positions, and unemployment reached 21.5 percent by May 2002, showing an increase of 74.2 percent between 1998 and 2002. Underemployment (part-time employment) was 30.3 percent. In 1991, when SAP policies began, the unemployment rate was 6.3 percent. During the past ten years the income gap between the richest and the poorest 10 percent of the population grew 70 percent, but in the first half of 2002 this gap increased another 37 percent. A salary in 2002 had a 50 percent purchasing capacity compared with the same salary in 1974 (22) . In 2002, the poorest quintile of the population received 2.7 percent of the total income, while the richest quintile received 54.3 percent. This gap increased 77 percent between 1998 and 2002. Global Argentinean inequity in 2001, measured by a Gini coefficient of 0.534, reached the highest level in national history (23) .
These conditions especially affected people living in poverty. In May 2002, the proportion of the national population living below the poverty level grew to 51 percent, though that average hid large regional differences; some provinces had poverty rates as high as 71 percent, while Buenos Aires City had a rate of only 11.8 percent. The proportion of the national population living below the indigent level reached 22 percent. Again, some provinces had an indigent level of more than 39 percent, while Buenos Aires City had a 2.5 percent level (24) . 2 Between 1998 and 2002, the population living at the poverty level increased 59 percent, and at the indigent level 128 percent (22) . Sixteen percent of the population between 15 and 24 years old was neither attending any type of educational institution nor working. By 2002, two out of ten heads of households below the poverty level were unemployed; in 20 percent of these households, none of the members worked; in 50 percent of these households, working members did not receive labor protection, such as health insurance and contributions to pension funds (25) .
In health care financing and delivery, the situation also reached a critical level. National social security institutions that covered 11 million people received 12 percent less income between 2002 and 2003. The Program of Integral Medical Care (Programa de Atención Médica Integral, PAMI), which covered 3.2 million retired people, absorbed a 40 percent decrease in income. The cumulative effect of increased unemployment rate, delay in payments of employer/employee contributions, and widespread fiscal evasion caused this decrease in income. PAMI accumulated a deficit equivalent to 75 percent of its previous annual budget. During 2002, the social security sector accumulated a debt of $3 billion to private providers, including pharmacies, which resulted in cutbacks in the services contracted by the social security institutions.
Because of the situation in the social security sector and the general socioeconomic crisis, public hospitals showed a marked increase in demand for services. The number of people with only public coverage increased from 36 to 43 percent between October 2001 and May 2002. A World Bank survey during 2002 showed that 16 percent of the people using public hospitals between October 2001 and June 2002 had social security coverage. Nine percent of these patients held PAMI coverage, 2 percent had coverage through a prepaid plan, and 5 percent had other social security coverage (19) . Public hospitals needed to attend to this increased demand for health care despite a reduced budget due to the fiscal crisis within national and provincial administrations. Because of their own crisis, social security institutions refused to pay public hospital bills, with the justification that the public hospitals had not obtained approval for these services and that the prices of most services billed for surpassed those of the private sector. Staff members at public hospitals claimed that the social security institutions established complex administrative procedures to avoid paying for the services. Public hospitals, by law, cannot refuse to see patients; some evaluations indicated that the costs to increase administrative staffing to handle the increased paperwork involved would deepen the economic crisis in the public sector. Some public hospitals tried to collect "voluntary" user fees, a barrier for poor people seeking health care (26) . In Argentina, public hospitals increasingly have served the impoverished middle class and working class, failing to meet the needs of the population living in poverty as historically defined.
In interviews, leaders of the physicians' associations that work in the public sector reported serious financial restrictions in the hospitals of Buenos Aires Province between 2000 and 2003. These restrictions caused strategic areas of several hospitals to close, such as surgical suites and entire wards, due to the lack of nurses and janitorial staff, among other reasons. Pharmacy shelves were inadequately stocked. Patients who required care needed to buy medications and other important supplies to take with them to the hospitals.
According to the cited World Bank survey, analyzed by Uribe and Schwab (19) , people confronted more barriers trying to access health care than before the crisis. Among the interviewed households needing health care between October 2001 and June 2002, 38 percent reported at least one member who could not buy prescriptions; 27 percent reported they could not visit a physician despite needing to do so; and 33 percent reported they could not get the tests prescribed by their physicians. Regarding barriers, according to respondents' health care coverage, the data showed that in 41 percent of the households with social security coverage, at least one member encountered problems in receiving medical consultations, buying medications, or obtaining tests, compared with 7 percent of people with private coverage, 2 percent of those with double coverage, and 51 percent of those who depended on public hospitals. Lack of money for copayments, honorariums, or medications was the principal cause for these barriers. This situation affected 66 percent of the households interviewed. Loss of medical services under prepaid plans or social security institutions for households no longer covered emerged as another important cause for access barriers.
GOVERNMENT RESPONSES TO THE CRISIS
Despite the adverse results of the first SAPs, the World Bank, International Monetary Fund, and U.S. government (which controls both institutions) insisted, during the worst moments of the crisis, on continuing the same recipe. Official pronouncements stated that, if Argentina wanted to receive new loans, it needed to apply for a new package of SAPs that included, among other actions, a continued decrease in public social expenditures (health and education), cutbacks in civil positions, reduction of salaries and pensions, changing of the corporate bankruptcy law to favor multinational corporations, decline of provincial sovereignty, and authorization of military base installations (27) .
The fifth government appointed by the National Congress approved all these requirements. 3 In March 2002, the government approved Decree-Law 486, declaring a health emergency. The law permitted the government to establish the Emergency Obligatory Medical Program (Programa Médico Obligatorio de Emergencia, PMOE) to replace the previous Obligatory Medical Program (PMO) established in 1995 as part of the health care system reform. That PMO included a list of authorized services that the social security institutions and prepaid plans were obligated to provide to beneficiaries. But especially for the prepaid plans, PMO regulated obligations to enrollees by eliminating the possibility of offering partial plans or excluding some expensive services. PMOE further decreased the number of services that the social security institutions and prepaid plans covered. It also increased copayments for prescriptions from 40 to 60 percent and reduced coverage for many prescription drugs. In an interview in 2003, Dr. Ruben Torres, chief of the government agency that controlled social security institutions, the Oversight Agency for Health Systems (Superintendencia de Sistemas de Salud), stated that PMOE promoted stabilization of the social security debt. PMOE also proved useful for prepaid plans, because offering the spectrum of services mandated by the previous PMO was no longer profitable enough. The crisis presented an opportunity to decrease the obligations of social security institutions and prepaid plan to their beneficiaries.
The Minister of Health of the transitional government, Dr. Ginés González García, stated publicly several times that he saw in the crisis an opportunity to change the system's rules. Directing his energies toward the pharmaceutical market, he considered his administration's greatest triumph to be the National Congress's approval of the law obligating physicians to prescribe medicines by generic names rather than brand names (Law 25,549). This law created the possibility for pharmacists to provide less expensive brand-name medications. These medications are not to be confused with generic drugs, which are neither produced nor imported by any pharmaceutical company in Argentina.
Several groups questioned the law by claiming that substitution does not always preserve the quality necessary for a particular prescription and that, according to some experts, numerous substitutions had presented serious dangers to patients' health. During the Argentinean Conference on Cardiology in 2002, experts indicated that a lack of generic drugs in Argentina made substitution difficult, because similarly marketed medications have not had to undergo studies on bio-equivalency for approval by the government agency that controls foods and drugs (28, 29) .
One interviewee pointed out that the pharmaceutical companies were implementing an unpublicized approach that encouraged social security institutions and prepaid plans to circumvent the law. These companies offered a 40 percent discount to social security institutions and prepaid plans if the physicians working for them continued prescribing brand names. The PMOE established 40 percent as the obligatory percentage of coverage that social security institutions and prepaid plans must pay for ambulatory prescriptions. Institutions that accepted such an agreement with the pharmaceutical companies considerably decreased their prescription drug expenditures.
According to our informant, although PAMI, the social security institution that provides services to the elderly, remained under the authority of the National Ministry of Health, this institution negotiated a similar agreement with the pharmaceutical companies. Moreover, in 2001, pharmaceutical companies succeeded in convincing PAMI to change the drug formulary based on World Health Organization recommendations, developed by a Committee on Rational Use of Medications. PAMI introduced in its drug formulary very expensive and/or unnecessary medications for which senior patients had minimum or no coverage, paying 80 to 100 percent of the costs. The PAMI population consumes about 35 percent of all prescribed medications in the country, making this social security institution an important target for the pharmaceutical industry. The government has not (as of late 2005) introduced sanctions against the social security institutions under its control or regulation.
During the same period, González García and his team developed a program, Remediar, partially financed by a redefined loan (OC-AR-1193), which the IADB had originally supported financially to develop provincial health insurance for poor people under the management of the provincial social security institutions in three provinces. Only Córdoba Province was maintained in the original project; the rest of the funds were directed to finance Remediar. Approved in April 2002 and initiated in October 2002, the final project received 60 percent of its financing from the IADB and the remainder from the Argentinean government. The project aimed to provide 48 essential drugs to the poorest population at no cost. According to its general coordinator, Remediar adopted two objectives: to facilitate the access of the poor population to prescriptions and to reinforce the primary care level, because the prescriptions had become available only at primary care centers, not in hospitals. Official data indicated that the program augmented outpatient visits at the primary care level by 25 percent (30) .
Remediar retained the central orientation developed by IFIs during the 1990s, which intended to combat poverty through focused programs that in fact did not reach the most vulnerable people, as revealed by a World Bank report published in 2002. This report analyzed a project called PROMIN, for which the Bank provided a loan, to reach poor mothers and their children under the age of six. In the report, Bank officials concluded that the program had been unable to serve the targeted people during the crisis and that health indicators and service utilization data showed a profound deterioration (19) . Professional associations, such as the Associated Union of Health Professionals in Buenos Aires Province, criticized Remediar. This association conducted a survey in the ambulatory area of an important public hospital in Buenos Aires Province that serves a poor population. The results showed that 44 percent of respondents came to the hospital and not to the primary care centers, even though they could receive free medication through Remediar at the centers. To explain this non-utilization, the interviewees stated that health workers at the primary care centers requested payment of user fees that people could not afford. Other problems mentioned by interviewees included geographic barriers and a lack of confidence in the quality and continuity of the health care offered.
The Buenos Aires Union of Health Professionals also criticized the medication policy, because hospital pharmacies did not stock even the most commonly needed medications, and approximately 70 percent of people left the hospitals without their prescriptions filled (31) . This situation required that patients travel to the primary care centers to obtain the medications, increasing the overall expenditures for people who often could not afford the cost of bus tickets.
Remediar promoters defended the idea that, if medications were available at the primary care centers, patients would use services at this level. The promoters expected that such services would prove less costly than those at hospitals and could resolve about 80 percent of the population's health problems. The apparent error of the promoters derived from a fragmented approach to a systemic problem and an assumption that an improvement in the efficiency of health care services could occur without any additional investment in the public sector. As a result of this assumption, the government did not invest the funds needed for several key actions: building new primary care centers in underserved areas, repairing existing structures, increasing salaries that had deteriorated, continuing education for health personnel to improve the quality of services, providing medical supplies, supervising the provision of services, and coordinating referrals.
Moreover, an important characteristic of the Remediar program, clarified by a research group at the University of Buenos Aires School of Medicine, was its expenditures for medications (32) . By 2006, according to this study, Remediar would spend more than $160 million for medications from private pharmaceutical companies. This figure represented 69.7 percent of the total budget provided by the IADB loan and the Argentinean government. Remediar devoted the remainder of the budget to creating health insurance for the poor population in a single province (Córdoba), developing communication efforts, and paying for administration, supervision, and consulting companies to develop various parts of the provincial project.
The School of Medicine research group pointed out that, among Remediar's expenditures on medication, 66.5 percent went to medications that the 40 public laboratories still under the administration of government institutions could have supplied. These public laboratories required investment to increase productivity and quality control. By the projected end of Remediar in 2006, according to the same research group, the program will have spent its entire allocated budget without any investment in the existing infrastructure capable of producing the most important medications that the program required. Without a political decision to reverse these trends, by the end of the Remediar program the external debt will have increased by about $140 million without any substantial investment in the public sector. Additionally, without a new loan, the government will not be able to offer free medication to the huge number of poor people in Argentina (32) . Remediar will then become another fragmented program that favored private interests rather than strengthening the public system.
On the other hand, the national Minister of Health (as of late 2005), Dr. González García, has shown great interest in strengthening reforms in the public sector. In 1998, González García, then Minister of Health in Buenos Aires Province, organized an international meeting, the proceedings of which were published in the book Public Health Insurance (33) . At this meeting all the participants, including González García, defended the need for national health insurance. The chief of the World Bank's "social sector" programs in Argentina explicitly discussed first-and second-generation reforms. First-generation reforms included public hospitals, national social security institutions, primary care services, and child and maternal health. The second generation involved development of a public insurance system for poor people and reforms in provincial social security institutions. This World Bank official explained the benefits that managed care brought to the Argentinean health system. He concluded that the first-generation reforms were already established ideologically and that the Bank then faced two challenges: improving health access to poor people and reforming provincial social security institutions.
In 1999, the IADB granted a loan to the national government for support of the provincial social security institutions, which administered the health care benefits of public employees, in initiating a second generation of reforms that included development of provincial health insurance for poor people. The project specified two goals: (a) to concentrate funds for health care services in the provincial social security institution, and (b) to develop an agreement with managed care organizations to administer the funds and to contract public and private entities for provision of services to social security beneficiaries and to poor people through public coverage. Although officials planned that this project would start in three provinces, Córdoba, Salta, and La Pampa, only Córdoba succeeded in obtaining the funds. By late 2002, as explained previously, only Córdoba remained in the original project, and the federal government redirected the rest of the funds to Remediar.
In Córdoba Province, the IADB and the national government developed the project without public notice; the newly elected governor of Córdoba Province signed the agreement before his term of office even began (34) . A union of public workers, together with several community organizations, discovered the secret document and denounced the agreement. A series of protests started, with the diffusion of a document that analyzed the new government's intention to give the newly available funds to managed care organizations owned by corrupt national union leaders and multinational corporations (35) . According to our key informants, groups interested in managing these extensive funds paid millions of dollars to bribe provincial legislators and union leaders. The same groups threatened some public officials, certain officials lost their jobs, and some officials experienced demotion to menial positions, resulting in economic and psychological damage. This organized resistance delayed the project by approximately one year, but the powerful groups standing to gain from the project finally moved it forward. However, the struggles led to some success, since the government and its allies then faced continuing opposition.
Estimated profits for the groups benefiting from this reform decreased after these protests. The public received information about the mechanisms that managed care organizations used to decrease access through bureaucratic procedures and to deny health care services. Community and professional leaders denounced the resulting program. A few years later, some of the managed care organizations left the province. Activists renewed their struggle against the corrupt practices of interest groups that insisted on obtaining profit even from public funds dedicated to health services for the poor and the elderly.
Despite these mostly unsuccessful experiences, legislators in Buenos Aires Province, Argentina's richest and most populous province, introduced a Public Health Insurance Law. This law aimed to establish a similar project as Córdoba's. The reform in Buenos Aires Province seemed to reestablish the same kind of project that the World Bank had proposed in 1998 through the notion of secondgeneration reform.
Despite its critical discourse against IFIs, the national government led by Nestor Kirchner, which came to power in the election of 2002, repeated the same line of reforms. The new government continued to disinvest in the public health sector. This policy surprised many of the government's supporters, since the public sector provided services to the increased number of impoverished people that crowded public hospitals during and after the 2001 crisis. These public institutions delivered services despite the financial crisis, lack of elementary supplies and medications, and low wages for workers.
SOCIAL MOVEMENTS AND ALTERNATIVE RESPONSES
While Argentineans lived through this profound crisis, activists organized alternative social movements in a new way, unlike the political movements of the 1970s. Intellectuals led the earlier social movements, whereas leaders of the new movements include unemployed workers, landless workers, workers from self-managed factories (organized and controlled by their workers), peasants, and neighborhood assemblies. The new leaders have invited intellectuals to help in the organization of popular universities and to share their ideas about technical developments in agriculture, industrial production, and health care, among others. In these struggles, intellectuals have agreed not to assume leadership positions or shift the movements toward traditional left-wing parties. The organization of the movements has remained horizontal and democratic; women have gained an important leadership role.
Recent struggles have involved demands for land, jobs, workers' control of the factories, demilitarization, water and other natural resources, health care, and education, among others. Activists have resisted trade agreements such as the Free Trade Area of the Americas, as well as efforts to expand U.S. military activities in the region as an extension of Plan Colombia. Several groups have organized around health issues and have developed regional and national networks. In our observations, three groups emerged as especially prominent.
First, the movement in defense of the public health care system, led by the Associated Union of Health Professionals in Buenos Aires Province (Asociación de Profesionales de la Salud de la Provincia de Buenos Aires), representing 66 public hospitals and 8,000 professionals who work in the public hospitals of Buenos Aires Province, has adopted several goals. In addition to exchanging knowledge and information about needs, activists have aimed to show that public hospitals have not delivered adequate services to patients because the provincial government has not carried out its obligations to guarantee the people's health. The movement has presented proposals at various levels of government to show that an integral, egalitarian, and free public health system remains possible at this critical moment.
Second, the movement for recognition of health care as a human right (Cátedra Libre de Derechos Humanos) emerged within the City of Buenos Aires at Argentina's largest, and still public, school of medicine. Originally, the professionals who created the Cátedra dedicated their efforts to investigating and demanding prosecution of physicians who collaborated with the last dictatorship by torturing prisoners and delivering babies who later disappeared. Investigations by the Cátedra also included developing lists of health care workers, physicians, and students, linked to the school of medicine, who disappeared. In this way, activists keep alive the memory of those who previously struggled against injustice.
Later, the Cátedra expanded into a coalition among professors, researchers, members of the public laboratories that produce medications, neighborhood assemblies, and human rights organizations that has responded to the new forms of injustice. This movement has developed proposals concerning production of medications in public institutions and has analyzed government expenditures in covering medication for the poor, as explained earlier. In addition, the coalition presented a report to the Inter-American Commission of Human Rights of the Organization of American States that exposed the Argentinean population's critical health situation. The report demonstrated the decline in health and poverty indicators and described the critical situation in public hospitals (lack of supplies and medication, delays in salary payments, etc.). Cátedra representatives asked the commission to intervene by further investigating the situation.
Third, a movement of health workers, including about 160 professionals and technicians, together with neighborhood assemblies and the National Movement of Workers Self-Management Factories, assumed control of several completely equipped but abandoned private clinics. With national and international support, this movement developed a proposal concerning health care for workers in the self-management factories and members of the neighborhood assemblies. Health services began when professionals started visiting factories to conduct clinical examinations and basic lab tests of workers to assess the health situation. These professionals have involved other people through music festivals to raise funds and especially to show that alternative proposals remain possible that will renew solidarity and defend health care as a human right.
DISCUSSION
Health system reforms developed during the past 15 years have roots in the deep structural changes that occurred during the capitalist crisis of the mid-1970s that produced a radical social and economic transformation. Finance capital became dominant in the world economy, and the development of technology and informatics facilitated the movement of capital throughout the world. Deregulation of national economies promoted a free flow of finance capital among countries. Neoliberal forces developed a major ideological campaign, favored by the fall of the Soviet Union in 1989, to remove the welfare state, which these forces blamed for economic stagnation. An ideology of free markets, competition, and individualism gained credibility as a rationale for change worldwide.
Several changes in health care accompanied these more general economic and ideological changes (36, 37) . Managed care, exported from the United States, became the basis of health systems throughout the world. Health care was ideologically transformed into a commodity, and each individual became responsible for obtaining it. According to this discourse, state administrations would pay only for minimum insurance packages for those unable to afford health services. Private insurance companies became the favored administrators of social security and public sector funds for health care. Private and public providers entered into competition with one another, based on price and perceived quality.
All of these arguments supporting the managed care model obscured the reality that finance capital required new economic arenas for investment in order to obtain profits. Health systems became a desirable arena for finance capital, pharmaceuticals, and other for-profit medical enterprises. International financial institutions, especially the World Bank and International Monetary Fund, pressured Latin American governments and other developing countries to embrace reforms that would facilitate these economic processes. The World Bank took the principal role in health care system reforms.
Argentina became a paradigmatic case of a country that accepted the IFIs' recipes. At the beginning of the 1990s, Argentina initiated privatization reforms and facilitated-without any substantial restriction-the entry of finance capital, through national or multinational companies, into many areas of the economy, including the health care system. The reform began first at the ideological level, changing people's commonsense understanding toward accepting that health services no longer remained a right but rather had become a commodity to be purchased on the market by individuals, according to their capacity to pay. Health reform also took place with very limited public debate, turning the reform into a silent process (37) .
After ten years of these policies that subjected the majority of Argentinean people to poverty and hopelessness, the IFIs, as well as interested agents of the U.S. government, declared that the recipes were perfect but the Argentinean government had failed in their application. They also declared that corruptionlooking only at who received, not at who paid, bribes-was an endemic problem that made it impossible to transform the health care system, among other reforms to serve the people. But these technocratic interpretations "forget" to understand that each reform process is developed in specific societies by specific economic and political interest groups. They also seem to ignore that the international economic actors in the globalization era are not neutral or charity organizations. They are the most powerful and concentrated groups, battling among themselves to obtain natural and financial resources around the world.
The Argentinean case permits us to analyze these adverse effects of the global economy on the peoples of developing countries. Clearly, the health systems in Argentina and other countries, including the United States, require reform, but not controlled by the private financial sector. Until now the official reformers of health systems have facilitated profit for insurance and managed care organizations, financial corporations, and companies that produce medications and medical high technology. In Argentina, the World Bank and the IADB reinitiated the lending process to advance reforms in the same way as before the crisis.
The introduction of finance capital in the social security and public sectors of health care resulted from the globalization process. A second result was the introduction of finance capital in the ownership of hospitals, dialysis and diagnosis centers, home care, blood banks, and ambulance and emergency services, among others. International agreements under the World Trade Organization support these processes. For instance, under the General Agreement on Trade in Services, the processes become official and obligatory for countries, such as Argentina, that have agreed to open hospital services and health insurance to international competition. The Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights strengthens the position of multinational pharmaceutical companies based in Europe, Argentina, the United States, and other countries (38) . In Argentina, post-2001 legislation and Remediar have become parts of this struggle.
Meanwhile, as shown by popular organizing in Argentina, people are creating new paths that are modifying the capitalist system. These actions could become a seed for the emergence of a more just world for millions of suffering people. The social movements in Argentina, together with movements elsewhere in Latin America and throughout the world, are moving in this hopeful direction.
